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Abstract
We investigate whether the investment-cash ßow sensitivity is monotonic in the degree
of Þnancing constraints. By using a large panel of publicly traded non-Þnancial U.K. Þrms,
we show that the investment-cash ßow sensitivity is neither monotonically increasing nor
decreasing in the most common proxies of Þnancing constraints; on the contrary, an
inverse U-shaped relationship is observed. Robustness exercises show that the parameter
of interest displays, to some extent, a monotonic behavior with respect to size only;
however, in contrast with much of the relevant literature, it is found to be greater for larger
Þrms, whose characteristics would hardly lead the researcher to classify them as more
Þnancially constrained. If taken as a whole, our Þndings suggest that higher investment-
cash ßow sensitivities may hardly be used as evidence of greater Þnancial constraints.
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11 Introduction
It is known that capital market imperfections - asymmetric information and costly agency
conßicts - lead to a positive correlation between the investment level of a Þrm and its internal
wealth. It is generally thought that asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders
about the Þrm’s growth opportunities may drive a wedge between the cost of internal and
external Þnancing; hence, Þrms lacking su cient internal funds to Þnance investment ex-
penditures are adversely a!ected (Myers, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Greenwald, Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1984; Stein, 1998). Therefore, the higher the Þrm’s internal wealth, the smaller
the impact of external Þnance on investment; for this reason, investment is expected to be
positively related to internal wealth. There is also ample evidence to support such theoretical
prediction which indeed shows that, in presence of capital market imperfections, cash ßow or
cash stocks are positively correlated to investment (see, e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen,
1988; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998 among others).1
Empirical results from a large number of studies also suggest that the parameter mea-
suring the sensitivity of investment to cash ßow is higher for Þrms that su!er more from
capital market imperfections - Þnancially constrained Þrms. These studies typically split
samples of Þrms according to some a priori proxies of Þnancing constraints and compare the
point estimates of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity estimated across such sub-samples.
At a Þrst glance, the evidence seems to suggest that Þrms classiÞed as more Þnancially con-
strained tend to exhibit a greater sensitivity of investment to cash ßow. Therefore, an higher
investment-cash ßow sensitivity has been traditionally taken as evidence of more severe Þ-
nancing constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Whited, 1992; Hubbard, Kashyap
and Withed, 1995; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998).
However, this view is challenged by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). They argue that, while
it is reasonable to expect that in presence of Þnancial market imperfections Þrms display a
positive investment-cash ßow sensitivity, it does not necessarily follow that the magnitude of
this parameter should monotonically increase with the degree of Þnancing constraints. They
combine balance sheet data with information collected from annual management statements
about the Þnancial status of Þrms for the sub-sample of 49 low-dividend paying Þrms classiÞed
1Apart from theoretical issues, such a correlation may depend on the informative contents of the proxies of
the internal wealth that are usually employed in performing empirical exercises. In other words, if the average
  - which is usually employed as a proxy for the marginal one - is a poor proxy for investment opportunities,
any Þnancial variables may have explanatory power for investment. In this case, the cash ßow sensitivity would
merely capture a relationship between investments and expectations of proÞtability, not fully captured by the
average  . This point is of great importance and it has been largely debated. On the one hand, however,
the excess sensitivity of investment to cash ßow would still exist even after using more reÞned estimators
(Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998). On the other hand, Hubbard (1998) suggests that such excess sensitivity
would hardly depends on econometric issue only. For these reasons, and in line with much of the previous
literature, in what follows we assume that the average   is a good proxy for the marginal one.
2as Þnancially constrained by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). They Þnd that 85 percent
of these Þrms “could have increased their investment [...] if they had so chosen” (p.171).
They also show that these Þrms, classiÞed as less Þnancially constrained, exhibit a greater
investment-cash ßow sensitivity than those classiÞed as more Þnancially constrained. Rather
than increasing monotonically with the degree of Þnancing constraints, the investment-cash
ßow sensitivity tends to decrease monotonically. This is the Þrst piece of evidence as to the
suggestion that a higher sensitivity of investment to cash ßow may not be taken as evidence
of greater Þnancing constraints. Their small sample evidence is supported by Cleary (1999)
that, by using a large sample of U.S. non-Þnancial Þrms, shows that the cash ßow sensitivity
is lower for classes of Þrms which are, according to the sorting criteria proposed by Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen (1988), more likely to be Þnancially constrained.
Results from the two strands of literature are clearly in sharp contrast with each other,
and the debate is still ongoing. On the one hand, some authors try to reconcile the two
di!erent Þndings in a unique theoretical framework (Almeida, 2000; Cleary, Povel and Raith,
2005). On the other hand, some researchers still use the investment cash ßow sensitivity as
a measure of the degree of Þnancing constraints (just as examples, see Love, 2001; Giannetti
and Himmelberg, 2002; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love, 2002; Almeida and Campello, 2004;
Pawlina and Renneborg, 2004; Mizen and Vermulen, 2005). In our opinion, the use of the
empirical framework is still reasonable, because both Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary
(1999) Þnd a monotonic behavior of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity. More precisely,
their empirical results suggest that the parameter increases, instead of decreasing, as Þnancial
constraints relax. For this reason, in the case that they have misclassiÞed Þrms, their results
are not strictly against those of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). It is the case to
observe that this is exactly the reason why the debate has moved from the magnitude of the
estimated investment-cash ßow sensitivity, to the ability of splitting criteria to capture the
extent of Þnancial constraints faced by Þrms (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 2000; Kaplan
and Zingales, 2000).
The analysis in this paper suggests that the investment-cash ßow sensitivity should not
be used as a measure of the wedge between the cost of internal and external Þnancing if it
reveals to be non-monotonic in the most common proxies of Þnancing constraints, regardless
of whether Þnancial constraints monotonically increase or decrease across classes of Þrms. To
this aim, we provide a detailed analysis of the monotonicity characteristics of the investment-
cash ßow sensitivity.
Our starting point is the evidence that “being Þnancially constrained” is an unobservable
characteristic of Þrms, and that managers have a clear incentive not to disclose such infor-
mation - actually this is exactly what makes, in principle, all splitting criteria questionable.
Despite this consideration, both the results by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) heavily rely upon the assumption that Þrms may be ordered
3according to the degree of Þnancing constraints they face by means of some criteria - relying
either on quantitative balance sheet variables, or on management statements, or even on the
probability of belonging to a particular class of dividends as in Cleary (1999). In doing so,
the validity of the entire procedure - splitting the available sample, estimating and comparing
the investment-cash ßow sensitivities across sub-samples - depends on whether the ordering
criteria e!ectively capture the extent to which Þrms are constrained: in such frameworks,
a monotonically increasing or decreasing investment-cash ßow sensitivity may be used as a
measure of the importance of Þnancing constraints only if proxies of Þnancing constraints
successfully identify sub-samples of Þnancially constrained Þrms.
In order to avoid the need of relying on statements about the severity of Þnancial con-
straints we prefer, rather than proposing a new and possibly again arguable classiÞcation
criterion, to analyze whether the investment-cash ßow sensitivity displays a monotonic be-
havior in the most common proxies of Þnancing constraints. Once having studied the em-
pirical shape of the relationship between such proxies and the magnitude of the investment
cash ßow sensitivity, we attempt to investigate the empirical e!ectiveness of such variables
in identifying the Þrm’s Þnancial status. Notice that, in the case the parameter of interest
results to be non-monotonic, the entire procedure should be rejected: either the investment
cash ßow sensitivity is non-monotonic in the degree of Þnancing constraints, or the proxy
we use are unrelated to the presence of Þnancing constraints. However, it is the case to
highlight that, because we employ the standard model of investment behavior (  model of
investment), the most common econometric technique (a panel data framework) and the most
common proxies of Þnancing constraints (dividends, size, cash stocks and leverage), such a
result would a!ect in both cases large part of the literature on the argument.
More speciÞcally, we begin by estimating the investment-cash ßow sensitivity for an un-
balanced panel of 1,195 non-Þnancial U.K. Þrms from 1984 to 2002 - for a total of 14,630
Þrm-year observations. Then, we order our sample using the dividend payout criterion and
we progressively remove the lowest 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50 percent of the
observations, in such a way to obtain 10 sub-samples of Þrm-year observations displaying
increasing dividend payout ratios. We estimate the investment-cash ßow sensitivity for each
of these classes and we test the null hypothesis that these parameters do not statistically
di!er from the parameter estimated for the entire sample.
Notice that we can perform such analysis without making any statement on the Þnancial
status of the Þrms. However, if the dividend payout ratio is inversely related to the degree of
Þnancing constraints and if the investment-cash ßow sensitivity is higher for Þrms that are
more likely to be Þnancially constrained, one would then expect that the investment cash-ßow
sensitivity monotonically decreases across our classes of Þrms. Alternatively, if the dividend
payout ratio is inversely related to the degree of Þnancing constraints but the investment-cash
ßow sensitivity is higher for Þrms that are less likely to be Þnancially constrained, it would be
4expected that the investment cash-ßow sensitivity monotonically increases across our classes
of Þrms. As a robustness exercise, we perform our analysis also by using other common
proxies of Þnancing constraints as ordering criteria, alternative estimation frameworks and
di!erent empirical speciÞcations of the   model.
The Þndings of this analysis suggest that the investment-cash ßow sensitivity neither
monotonically increases nor decreases with dividend payout ratios, size, leverage and cash
holdings. Rather, we Þnd evidence of an inverse “U-shaped” relationship between the investment-
cash ßow sensitivity and each proxy of Þnancing constraints: as their average level in the
sample increases, the investment-cash ßow sensitivity increases Þrst, and then decreases.
Therefore, this Þrst stage of the analysis suggest that either the sorting criteria we use are
unrelated to Þnancing constraints or that the magnitude of the investment-cash ßow sensi-
tivity does not depend on the degree of Þnancing constraints only. If anything, robustness
exercises show that size seems the only ordering criterion for which the parameter of inter-
est is monotonic. However, and again in contrast with much of the relevant literature, the
cash ßow sensitivity result to be higher for larger Þrms, which we show that may hardly be
considered as Þnancially constrained with respect to smaller ones.
To shed further light on this, we also investigate the extent to which the proxies we use to
build our classes of Þrms are related to Þnancing constraints. It is again the case to underline
that, since being Þnancially constrained is normally not a directly observable characteristic
of Þrms, the conclusions one could draw from this investigation are not expected to be as
strong as those of the Þrst stage of our analysis. Results from this additional evidence seems
to suggest that, among the proxies we used, dividend payouts and leverage and cash policies
are not driven by Þnancing constraints only.
We believe that our analysis is original from several points of view. First, our testing
procedure provides signiÞcant insights into the e!ectiveness of the investment-cash ßow sen-
sitivity as a measure of Þnancing constraints. Second, we run the Þrst stage of our analysis
without making statements about the level of Þnancing constraints faced by Þrms and, to
the best of our knowledge, we are the Þrst in doing so. Third, rather than just comparing
point estimates of the investment-cash ßow sensitivities across classes, we propose a formal
testing procedure for the null hypothesis that they do not signiÞcantly di!er. Fourth, we
take into account the possibility that Þrms change status over time - it has been argued
that it is unreasonable to hypothesize that a Þrm is constrained over long periods of time
(Schiantarelli, 1995). Fifth, our results rely on a large sample of Þrms and hence the critique
about the size and the heterogeneity of the sample, raised by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(2000) to Kaplan and Zingales (1997) does not apply to our analysis. Finally the following
exercise is Þrst ones which uses U.K. observations for studying the monotonic behavior of the
investment-cash ßow sensitivity.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the previous literature
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use. Section 4 presents empirical results and discusses their main implications for previous
literature. Section 5 gives some concluding remarks.
2 Background
2.1 Related Literature
Modigliani and Miller (1958) prove the irrelevance of the Þrm’s capital structure for the
investment decisions in a model of perfect and complete capital markets. However, since
then it has been shown that in presence of capital market imperfections the Þrm’s Þnancial
structure is relevant, and investment is sensitive to the availability of internal funds essentially
because of the cost advantage of the internal over the external Þnance (Myers and Majluf,
1984; Myers, 1984).
Many empirical studies Þnd that internal wealth - measured by liquidity, cash ßow, or
cash stocks - is signiÞcant in determining investment decisions, especially for those Þrms
that are more likely to face capital market imperfections. Beginning with Fazzari, Hubbard
and Petersen (1988) (hereafter FHP88), a large strand of the empirical literature provides
empirical support for this hypothesis. The evidence also suggests that the investment-cash
ßow sensitivity is higher for Þnancially constrained Þrms, which leads to the argument that
this parameter represents a measure of the degree of Þnancing constraints (Devereux and
Schiantarelli, 1989; Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991; Withed, 1992; Shaller, 1993; Bond
and Meghir, 1994; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; Hubbard, Kashyap and Withed, 1995;
Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998).
More speciÞcally, FHP88 classify a large panel of 422 U.S. manufacturing Þrms into three
groups according to their dividend payout ratios and argue that Þrms with lower dividend
payout ratios (higher retained earnings) are more likely to be liquidity constrained. They
Þnd that investment decisions of these Þrms are more sensitive to changes in cash ßows than
other groups. A large number of subsequent studies also uses dividends as their classiÞcation
criterion (Gilchrist 1991, Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited, 1995; Calomiris and Hubbard,
1995). Moreover, there are studies that use alternative proxies of Þnancing constraints - size,
group membership, age, ownership structure or debt ratings - and provides similar Þndings.
For example, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989), by classifying Þrms according to their size,
Þnd that the investment-cash ßow sensitivity is higher in larger Þrms, which are more likely
to be constrained because of agency problems. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) argue
that being member of a large industrial group relaxes Þnancing constraints to some extent and
show that these Þrms exhibit a lower investment-cash ßow sensitivity. By using a di!erent
set up - the Euler equation approach - Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994) Þnd that
6investment expenditures of Þrms with no bond ratings and low dividend payout ratios reveal
a higher sensitivity to internal funds.
The Þndings of these studies have been challenged by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (here-
after KZ97) on the basis that there is no theoretical reason to expect that the investment-cash
ßow sensitivity necessarily increases with the degree of Þnancing constraints. Moreover, they
perform an in-depth analysis of the sub-sample of 49 Þrms classiÞed as Þnancially constrained
in FHP88 by collecting information both from company annual reports about the Þnancial
position of Þrms and from balance sheet data. Then, they deÞne Þrms as being Þnancially
unconstrained if there is no evidence “that the Þrms could not have invested appreciably
more if their manager had so chosen” (KZ97:181), and Þnd that Þnancially constrained Þrms
actually display the lowest investment-cash ßow sensitivity. Such pattern is found for the
entire sample period, sub-periods, and individual years, and it leads the authors to claim
that the magnitude of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity does not provide a valid measure
of the strength of Þnancing constraints.
Their small sample evidence is supported by Cleary (1999). By using a large and het-
erogenous sample of 1,317 U.S. Þrms for the period 1987-94, he deÞnes three classes of Þrms:
Þrms with increasing dividends and more likely not Þnancially constrained; Þrms cutting div-
idends and likely Þnancially constrained and, Þnally, Þrms not changing dividends. Then, by
means of a multiple discriminant analysis - similar to Altman’s Z-score - he uses a number
of balance sheet variables that are likely to a!ect the characterization of a Þrm in one of the
groups. Finally, by estimating the investment-cash ßow sensitivity across the groups, the au-
thor shows that the investment decisions of Þrms with high creditworthiness are signiÞcantly
more sensitive to the availability of internal funds than those which are less creditworthy.
2.2 Motivation
It is the case to notice that, despite the Þndings of both KZ97 and Cleary (1999) call into
question both the analysis and the results of much of the relevant literature, investment
cash-ßow sensitivities are still used as a measure of Þnancing constraints (see, for instance
Almeida, 2000; Love, 2001; Giannetti and Himmelberg, 2002; and Himmelberg, Hubbard
and Love, 2002; Mizen and Vermulen, 2004; Pawlina and Renneborg, 2004; Almeida and
Campello, 2004). As said, the approach is reasonable, since it is easy to raise doubts about
the sorting criteria used both by KZ97 and Cleary (1999). Indeed, such a practice heavily
relies upon two assumptions, the Þrst of which relates to the possibility of identifying the
Þnancial status of Þrms - it is necessary to identify which group of Þrms is more likely to be
constrained.
However, “being constrained” is not, in the majority of cases, a directly observable char-
acteristic, nor a good manager would tell an interviewer or write in the annual report that the
7Þrm he is managing is so. Hence empirical studies - and especially those using a large number
of Þrm year observations - have to rely to some a priori criteria for discriminating between
constrained and unconstrained Þrms. Clearly, none of these criteria are free of criticism. For
example, Kaplan and Zingales (1995) criticize the dividend payout ratios as the most popular
criterion of classiÞcation. They argue that, according to the corporate Þnance theory, Þrms
should not pay dividends in the presence of taxes. They also point that the extant theories of
dividends policy do not provide insights about the average level of dividends. On the other
hand, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000) criticize the use of managers’ statements by
claiming that they may not reßect the real economic status of the Þrm.
The criterion based on size of Þrms is also arguable. Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989)
suggest that large Þrms are likely to face more Þnancing constraints because of agency prob-
lems. Conversely, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1994) Þnd that smaller Þrms tend to be
relatively more constrained. Similar arguments hold for criteria based on cash stocks and
leverage. Firms with low leverage may be classiÞed, a priori, as relatively unconstrained be-
cause their large debt capacity allow them to obtain easily external funds (Hoshi, Kashyap,
Scharfstein, 1991; Whited, 1992). However, other studies argue that these Þrms should, in-
stead, be deÞned as more constrained, because it is possible that low leverage is due to the
high cost of the external Þnance (Calomiris and Himmelberg, 1995). Similarly, high cash
holdings may signal either that Þrms are relatively unconstrained - because of the possibility
of Þnancing investment by using cash (Kashyap, Lamont and Stein, 1994) - or that they are
relatively constrained - because of the need of accumulating cash as precautionary saving in
order to avoid future Þnancing constraints (Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel, 1995).
In sum, there is no consensus on how Þnancially constrained Þrms should be identiÞed
in practice. The reason is that Þnancing constraints are identiÞed through their e!ects on
Þnancial indicators - as cash holdings, leverage, dividend payout ratio or size - but di!erent
Þrms respond in di!erent ways to Þnancing constraints. For example, Þnancial indicators
may signal not only Þnancing constraints but also a particular managers’ attitude. Clearly,
if Þrms are misclassiÞed, the reliability of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity as a measure
of Þnancing constraints become questionable.
The second assumption is that the sensitivity of investment to cash ßow is higher for Þrms
which are more Þnancially constrained - what has come to be known as the “monotonicity
condition” (KZ97). Nevertheless, KZ97 shows that in a simple one-period model there are
no theoretical reasons to expect that this is necessarily the case. More speciÞcally, they show
that, according to the assumptions made on the shape of the production and cost functions,
it is possible to build up cases where the parameter of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity
decreases with Þnancing constraints. Clearly, this issue becomes even more complicated in
a multiperiod model, where expected rather than actual Þnancing constraints may lead to
precautionary Þnancing policies. It is the case to notice that this is not only a theoretical
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less Þnancially constrained exhibit signiÞcantly greater investment-cash ßow sensitivities than
those appearing more Þnancially constrained. These results, conditional on correct splitting
criteria, are in contrast with the Þndings and the explanations of the prior literature.
Hence, in addition to the theoretical explanation that KZ97 provide, there exist also
evidence that a negative correlation between investment-cash ßow sensitivity and degree of
Þnancing constraints may exist: a non-monotonic relationship (or even an inverse relation-
ship) is not only theoretically possible, but is also empirically relevant. However, to the best
of our knowledge, the question of whether a non-monotonic relationship is empirically rele-
vant has not been tested. Indeed, what the results of both KZ97 and Cleary (1999) actually
document is the existence of a monotonic inverse relationship between the investment-cash
ßow sensitivity and the degree of Þnancing constraints, rather than the existence of a non-
monotonic relationship. Hence, in the case they have misclassiÞed Þrms, their results are not
strictly in contrast with those of the prior literature: this is the reason why the debate is
currently revolving about the e!ectiveness of the proxies, rather than on the magnitude of
the investment cash ßow sensitivity and the shape of the relationship between such parameter
and the degree of Þnancing constraints.
We believe that only if the investment-cash ßow sensitivity is strictly non-monotonic
in the proxies of Þnancing constraints which are typically used by researchers - not always
decreasing or increasing across classes of Þrms - we can claim that it should not be used
as a measure of the di!erential cost between internal and external Þnancing. Our aim is,
therefore, to perform a test of the monotonicity condition without relying upon statements
about the degree of Þnancial constraints faced by Þrms.
3 Research Design and Sample
3.1 Empirical Strategy
We consider the following empirical model, which is the most common among those used to
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where ! is investment, " represents a measure of the total capital stock, #1 is the inverse
of the marginal adjustment cost,   is the Tobin’s  , which represents the market-to-book
value of the Þrm, #2 is the investment-cash ßow sensitivity, $% is the cash ßow, &  and '!
are individual and year Þxed e!ects and, Þnally, ( ! is a white noise disturbance term.
Under some regularity conditions (Hayashi, 1982), the average   may be used to proxy
for the marginal  . Under the assumption that Þnancial markets are perfect, the parameter
9#2 should not be statistically di!erent from zero. According to the theory, a signiÞcant and
positive value of #2 would instead suggest the existence of asymmetric information and/or
agency costs.
The Þrst step of our research design involves the estimation of equation (1) using the entire
sample. We then order our sample using the dividend payout criterion, and progressively
remove the lowest 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50 percent of the observations, in such
a way to obtain 10 classes of Þrm-year observations displaying increasing dividend payout
ratios. Having estimated the investment-cash ßow sensitivity for each of these classes by
means of equation (1), we use such parameters to test the null hypothesis that they do not
statistically di!er from the parameter estimated for the entire sample.
Notice that this analysis may be performed without making statements about the degree
of Þnancial constraints faced by the sub-sample of Þrms we are progressively left with: if
the dividend payout ratio is inversely related to the degree of Þnancing constraints and the
investment-cash ßow sensitivity is higher in more Þnancially constrained Þrms, one would
expect that the investment cash-ßow sensitivity decreases across the sub-samples constructed
as described above. Conversely, if the investment-cash sensitivity is higher in less Þnancially
constrained Þrms the estimated parameter is expected to increase. If one fails to observe
such patterns, it would not be reasonable to make statements about the severity of Þnancing
constraints by relying upon the magnitude of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity, regardless
of whether Þnancing constraints are increasing or decreasing with dividends.
As explained earlier, we repeat our investigation by using Þrms’ total assets, taken as a
proxy for Þrms’ size. We obtain ten classes of Þrms for which size is progressively increasing.
Next, we estimate equation (1) across our classes, and we test whether their estimated pa-
rameters statistically di!er from the investment-cash ßow sensitivity for the entire sample. If
the degree of Þnancing constraints is meaningfully related to Þrm size, the investment-cash
ßow sensitivity should either monotonically decrease or monotonically increase across classes.
However, the investment-cash ßow sensitivity may hardly be used as a measure of Þnancing
constraints if this relationship is found to be non-monotonic.
Additionally, we obtain our classes of Þrms by means of a joint sorting criterion of cash
holdings and leverage. This is because there has been an ongoing debate as to whether Þrms
with high cash balances and low leverages should be classiÞed as more Þnancially constrained
or rather Þnancially conservative (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 2000; Kaplan and Zingales
2000; Iona, Leonida and Ozkan, 2004). Hence, we remove all Þrm-year observations having
cash holdings higher than 50 percent and leverage smaller than 10 percent. Next, we remove
observations having cash stocks higher than 40 percent and leverage smaller than 20 percent,
and so on to obtain classes where the average leverage increases and the average cash holdings
decreases. Because of the use of a joint criterion, our classes of Þrms cannot be obtained, in
this case, by removing a Þxed number of observations. Moreover, the number of Þrm-year
10observations we are left tends rapidly to zero; for these reasons, we analyze 8 classes of Þrms
rather than 10. In any case, we still can perform our empirical exercise without making
statements about the degree of Þnancing constraints of the sub-samples of Þrms we are left
with.
The change the deÞnition of sorting variable is not the only robustness exercise we perform.
We change also the empirical model we use to recover our parameters - by adding present
and past values of cash balances and leverage. Finally, we perform the analysis using several
alternative estimation frameworks - namely, the LSDV, a pooled OLS estimator and an
approach based on Fama and French (2002).
The approach we describe above has many advantages. First, in contrast to previous
studies, we allow Þrms to change status over time. It is argued that in practice Þnancial
status changes continuously, especially when using panel data involving several years (see
Schiantarelli, 1995 for a detailed discussion). Second, as in Cleary (1999), we use a large and
heterogeneous sample of Þrms. Therefore, our results are not driven by the homogeneity of
Þrms, which may be case for the KZ97 sample. Third, and more important, our results do not
crucially rely on the hypothesis that Þnancing constraints should relax or strengthen across
our sub-samples. Hence, we can proceed without identifying relatively unconstrained or
constrained classes of Þrms; we only need that the ordering criteria are related with Þnancing
constraints - to the best of our knowledge, we are the Þrst in doing so. Finally our analysis
represents the Þrst investigation of the monotonicity condition using U.K. observations.
At this point, we should note that if the monotonicity condition is empirically violated
we cannot strictly conclude that the magnitude of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity is not
driven by the severity of Þnancing constraints. Rather such Þnding would suggest that the
investment-cash ßow sensitivity is non monotonic in the most common proxies of Þnancing
constraints - so adding a new piece of evidence against the use of the entire procedure. The
correct conclusion that we may draw is that either the magnitude of the investment-cash ßow
sensitivity is not driven by the severity of Þnancing constraints, or the ordering criteria are
not related to the degree of Þnancing constraints. At this stage of the analysis, it is impossible
to distinguish which of these two alternatives holds.
Even in this case, because we employ the most common splitting criteria and the most
common empirical model, our conclusions would a!ect anyway a large fraction of the related
literature. However, to shed further light on this point, we provide additional evidence about
the ability of the sorting criteria to proxy Þnancing constraints. This allows us to draw
some conclusions as to which of the two alternatives holds. Note again that, because “being
Þnancially constrained” is an unobservable characteristic of Þrms, such second step analysis is
not expected to produce clear-cut conclusions, as in the case of our Þrst step of the analysis.
113.2 Data
Our pool of Þrms includes an unbalanced panel of publicly traded UK Þrms, from 1984 to
2002. Our initial sample is the set of all Þrms for which data are available on Datastream.
This database provides both accounting data for Þrms and market value of equity. The data
set we use has been constructed as follows. We exclude Þnancial Þrms from the sample;
from these Þrms we choose only those with at least three continuous time series observations
during the sample period. These criteria provide us with 1,195 Þrms, for a total of 14,630
Þrm-year observations.
We use standard accounting variables. We measure cash holdings as total cash and equiv-
alent items, cash ßow as pre-tax proÞt plus depreciation, leverage as total debt, investment is
measured as capital expenditures. All variables, including dividends, are normalized by total
assets, apart from the market-to-book ratio, which has been measured as the ratio of book
value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book
value of assets. We use total assets to proxy for the size of the Þrms. All Þnancial variables
are for the end of the Þscal year.
4 Discussion of Results
4.1 Preliminary Evidence on Financial Status and Financing Constraints
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the Þnancial variables used in the analysis for the
whole sample of 1,195 Þrms over the sample period. Results reported in this table show that
the average cash holdings is 11 percent and the median is 6 percent. These values are in line
with those reported for the US Þrms. For example, Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) report
that the mean and median values of the cash ratio are 8.1 and 4.7 percent respectively.
)please insert Table 1 here*
Table 2 reports correlations among variables. Investment is positively correlated to
market-to-book and cash ßow; moreover, it displays a low correlation with the dividend
payout ratio of Þrms. Market-to-book ratio is positively and highly correlated to cash hold-
ings. These results suggest that Þrms are more likely to hold larger cash reserves as long as
they have proÞtable investment opportunities.2
2Following Cleary (1999), we have winsorized a number of Þrm-year observations. This procedure consists
of assigning a cuto! value to observations displaying abnormal values of some variables. More speciÞcally,
we assign a value of -2 to 14 observations with abnormal negative values of cash ßow, and a value of 2
to two observations with abnormal positive values of cash ßow. This reduces the impact of outliers on
regression results without reducing the sample size; however, because we are winsorizing a total of 12 Þrm-
12)please insert Table 2 here*
Columns A and B in Table 3 report the mean and median values for two groups of Þrms -
those Þrms that pay dividends and Þrms that do not. Clearly, observations belonging to the
group of non-payer Þrms might be classiÞed as more Þnancially constrained in a FHP88 type
of study, as they are supposed to Þnance their investments by retaining earnings. Apart from
their behavior with respect to dividends, these Þrms are smaller than dividend-paying ones.
This in turn suggest that they may be prevented from undertaking new investments possibly
because of the presence of resource constraints in the external capital markets. Indeed,
although having higher investment opportunities - as shown by the average market-to book
ratio - these Þrms exhibit low levels of investment, negative cash ßows, high leverage ratios
and low cash holdings. The presence of Þnancing constraints for this group of Þrms seems
to be supported by their higher level of short term debt and lower level of long run debt
with respect to the payers Þrms. It is worth noting that these Þrms would be deÞned as
more Þnancially constrained also in a KZ97 style-study, according to which non Þnancially
constrained Þrm-years tend to include Þnancially healthy companies with low debt and high
cash (KZ97). The median values reveal that non-payer Þrms have a lower (higher) level of
cash holdings (leverage) compared to the dividend-payer Þrms.
)please insert Table 3 here*
In the same table, columns C to G report average values of variables regarding Þve groups
of Þrm-year observations obtained by splitting the entire distribution using four quartiles.
This exercise conÞrms that the dividend criterion is to some extent related to Þnancing
constraints. By moving across groups - i.e., from column C to G - Þnancing constraints seem
to relax both according to KZ97 and FHP88 criteria: cash holdings tend to increase, while
the level of leverage decreases. However, for our analysis we do not need to make statements
about the severity of Þnancing constraints. Instead, we only need that Þnancing constraints
are to some extent related to dividend payout ratios.
Table 4 presents means of Þnancial variables for six sub-samples of Þrm-year observations
classiÞed according to their size - proxied by the level of total assets. The evidence shows
that, as long as size increases, both the dividend payout ratio and investment increase, and
the market-to-book value decreases. This suggests that smaller Þrms, although they have
greater investment opportunities, tend to invest less than larger ones. Furthermore, they
have smaller cash ßows, which may signal liquidity problems. So, according to FHP88,
year observations, results still hold even after removing these observations from the dataset - to save space,
results are not reported.
13Þnancing constraints would tend to decrease across increasing classes of size. Conversely, in a
KZ97 style study, Þnancing constraints would always increase through classes of size: the level
of cash holdings decreases with the Þrm’s size; instead, the leverage level increases. Hence,
when the sample is ordered by means of size, it is unclear whether the degree of Þnancing
constraints increases or decreases across classes. This example makes particularly clear the
advantage of our approach, i.e. regardless of whether they increase or decrease, Þnancing
constraints seem to be related to Þrm size, and this is the only information we actually need.
)please insert Table 4 here*
Table 5 reports the mean values of Þnancial variables for classes of Þrm-year observations
obtained by means of a joint criterion of increasing leverage and decreasing cash holdings. The
evidence presented in this table suggests that smaller Þrms are more likely to be Þnancially
conservative. However, because cash holdings decrease and leverage ratios increase, as we
move from column A to E, according to KZ97 Þnancing constraints would increase across
these classes. In addition, moving from class A to E, observations show lower market-to-book
ratios; they also display higher levels of investment and dividend payouts, which according
to the analysis of FHP88, would suggest that Þnancing constraints tend to decrease across
classes.
)please insert Table 5 here*
If anything, the discussion above shows that the criteria proposed by FHP88 - and used
by much of the previous literature - lead often to opposite conclusions with respect to the
criteria suggested by KZ97. As said, this reduces the importance of the di!erences between
the results provided by FHP88 and KZ97. Indeed, if one of these papers has misclassiÞed
the Þnancial status of some of the sub-groups of Þrms, their empirical results are exactly
the same: the cash ßow sensitivity displays a monotonic empirical behavior when Þnancing
constraints change.
4.2 Regression Results
Table 6 reports regression results of some standard investment models, obtained using the
entire sample of Þrm-year observations. We present four regression models. In columns A
and B we report parameters estimated by means of a within groups estimator, which follow
closely the models proposed by FHP88, KZ97 and Cleary (1999). Results reported in column
A show that, as expected, both investment opportunities and internal funds are positively
14and signiÞcantly correlated with investment. Moreover, they display the expected signs.
Following FHP88, model B adds some lags of independent variables to the regressors set.
Again, the estimated coe cients of lagged independent variables are positively and robustly
correlated with investment. Models C and D provide results obtained by using a pooled OLS
estimator - both models include sector and time dummies to account, to some extent, for the
panel structure of the sample. Because of the upward bias due to the omission of the Þxed
e!ects, the values of estimated parameters increase with respect to the estimates obtained
with the within groups framework. However, the main result remains unchanged: internal
wealth is signiÞcantly correlated to investment. To sum up, the evidence points out that
Þrm’s investment decisions are sensitive to investment opportunities, and they are even more
sensitive to cash ßow. This is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by previous
studies, which rejects the hypothesis of perfect capital markets (FHP88; KZ97; Cleary, 1999).
)please insert Table 6 here*
Figure 1 shows how we obtain our sub-samples of Þrms. As explained above, we remove
from the total sample the Þrst 5% of Þrm-year observations with lower dividend payout ratios
(dotted lines), and estimate the investment-cash ßow sensitivity on the sample we are left with
(full line). We continue doing so in such a way to obtain 10 classes of Þrm-year observations
displaying increasing dividend payout ratios. The same exercise is also performed for ten
classes of size and, Þnally, eight classes of leverage and cash holdings.
)please insert Figure 1 here*
Table 7 presents regression results for these exercises which are performed, in line with the
previous studies, by means of the most common model of investment. In particular, we split
the Þrms in our sample into two groups only, namely dividends and non-dividends. Panel
A reports results for the entire sample of Þrms and for the group of dividend-payer Þrms.
Notice that when we remove non-payer Þrms, which would be classiÞed as relatively Þnan-
cially constrained both by FHP88 and KZ97, the estimated investment cash-ßow sensitivity
increases. This result is consistent with KZ97 and Cleary (1999), but it contradicts FHP88.
That is, if dividend payout ratio is used as an inverse proxy of Þnancing constraints, the
investment-cash ßow sensitivity is signiÞcantly higher for relatively Þnancially unconstrained
Þrms. According to KZ97, such Þnding runs counter the monotonicity hypothesis, since it
suggests an inverse relationships between degree of Þnancing constraints and investment-cash
ßow sensitivity.
15)please insert Table 7 here*
However, such a conclusion would be incorrect if non-payer Þrms were relatively uncon-
strained; in this case, empirical results would claim in favour of the monotonicity condition.
This example is clearly extreme - one would not normally classify non-payers as relatively
unconstrained - but illustrates our point: it is impossible to draw a clear conclusion from this
evidence, as we need to know which of the sub-samples is constrained. Instead, our proce-
dure allows us to test whether the direction of the relationship between degree of Þnancing
constraints and magnitude of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity changes across sub-samples.
Panel B shows estimation results obtained from our Þrst exercise. Class 1 is the sub-
sample we are left with when we remove the lowest 5 percent of the observations from the
entire sample ordered by increasing level of dividends. The Þndings clearly show that the
investment-cash ßow sensitivity estimated for this sub-sample is higher than that estimated
for the entire sample. Class 2 is the sample we are left with when we remove the lowest
10 percent of the observations. As before, results show that the investment-cash ßow sensi-
tivity increases. However, our results show that the investment-cash ßow sensitivity is not
monotonically increasing nor decreasing: by repeating the same exercise up to the tenth sub-
sample, the pattern of the estimated parameters shows a mixed evidence, which may lead
to contrasting conclusions. If, for example, the sample was split at the Þrst 5 percent and
at the Þrst 20 percent, the evidence would be in favour of KZ97: the investment-cash ßow
sensitivity increases as the dividend payout ratio increases (0.0163 vs 0.0276). However, if
the Þrst 10 percent and the Þrst 45 percent were chosen, the evidence would instead be in
favour of FHP88: the investment cash ßow sensitivity decreases as the dividend payout ratio
increases (0.0269 vs 0.0159).
Panel C reports results when the sample is ordered using Þrm size as the splitting criterion.
As mentioned earlier, this ordering criterion would lead FHP88 to claim that the degree of
Þnancing constraints monotonically decreases across our classes, and the opposite would be
argued by KZ97. However, regression results suggest that the monotonicity condition is
again violated, independently of whether the severity of Þnancing constraints is increasing
or decreasing across classes. The same conclusion also holds when Þrms are ordered by
increasing levels of leverage and decreasing levels of cash stocks (Panel D). As in the case of
size, the estimated investment-cash ßow sensitivity does not show a monotonic behavior in
the degree of Þnancing constraints.
It is worth noting that, in line with all previous literature, we compare cash-ßow sensi-
tivities which are obtained by using a di!erent number of observations; for this reason, even
if sensitivities di!er from each other, it does not necessarily follow that they are statistically
di!erent. In order to perform a more formal exercise, we use the investment-cash ßow sen-
sitivities estimated for all classes to test the null hypothesis that these parameters do not
16statistically di!er from the investment-cash ßow sensitivity estimated for the entire sample.
Table 8 shows results from this testing procedure. In column A we report the level of
the ordering criterion we are using to classify Þrms. Column B reports the estimated cash
ßow sensitivities for all sub-samples. Column C reports results from a test for equality of
slopes, where the null hypothesis is that the investment-cash ßow sensitivity estimated for
the entire sample does not di!er from the same parameter estimated for each sub-sample.
When ordered by dividends, the null hypothesis is not rejected for classes 1, 9 and 10. All
the remaining classes display a signiÞcantly higher investment-cash ßow sensitivity. This
evidence suggests that the relationship between dividend payout ratios and the magnitude
of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity is inverse “U-shaped”. To further conÞrm this result,
we use the investment-cash ßow sensitivity estimated for the Þrst class rejecting the null
hypothesis - namely, class 2 - to test the hypothesis that this parameter does not di!er
from that of all other classes of Þrms. Results are reported in column D. Notice that the null
hypothesis is rejected for classes 1, 9, 10 and for the whole sample. We repeat the same testing
procedure for the investment-cash ßow sensitivities estimated across classes of size and across
classes of leverage and cash holdings. Also in these cases, an inverse “U-shaped” relationship
between investment-cash ßow sensitivity and size, or leverage-cash holdings, prevails.
)please insert Table 8 here*
Figure 2 summarizes our Þndings and describes the violation of the monotonicity condition
in all three cases. We superimpose on Þgure 1 the estimated investment-cash ßow sensitivities
and a grey zone. This zone splits the picture in three areas: the Þrst one, where the null
hypothesis of equality of slopes between the parameter estimated for the entire sample and the
one relative to each class is not rejected (zone I); the second area, where this null hypothesis
is rejected (zone II) and, Þnally, the third one (zone III). In this last zone we report results
from the procedure we use to test the null hypothesis that the parameter estimated for the
Þrst class which rejects the above null hypothesis di!ers from parameters estimated for the
remaining classes (column D in table VIII). Note that when the sample is ordered by dividend
and size, instead of monotonically increasing, the investment-cash ßow sensitivity enters zone
I from below and goes back in this zone from above. When observations are ordered by using
cash stocks and leverage levels, the parameter goes in zone II from below and goes back
from above in the same zone, which also supports the existence of an inverse “U-shaped”
relationship between the degree of Þnancing constraints and the magnitude of the investment
cash ßow sensitivity.
)please insert Figure 2 here*
174.3 Robustness Checks
Our results are robust to the classiÞcation schemes we use to order our sample of Þrms: a non-
monotonic behavior arises regardless of whether we use dividend payout ratios, size or cash
stocks and leverage as sorting criterion. However, this section reports additional evidence to
examine the robustness of the empirical regularity we have just described.
Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) show that future growth opportunities and investment are
negatively correlated to leverage, especially for less proÞtable Þrms. This implies that the
pattern of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity might be also driven by leverage levels because
high debt burdens prevent companies from raising funds externally in order to invest, and
consequently they lead to higher investment-cash ßow sensitivities. The analysis by KZ97
suggests a similar argument for cash holdings. They argue that the e!ect of an extra dollar
of funds should be the same for the Þrm, regardless of whether the Þrm gets it this period (as
cash ßow) or whether it was present in the Þrm at the beginning of the period. KZ97 therefore
performs a robustness exercise including cash stocks in the estimating models. Accordingly,
we repeat our entire exercise by adding current and past values of leverage and cash stocks
to the regressors set. Results are reported in Figure 3.
)please insert Figure 3 here*
In all models independent variables are robustly correlated with investment, and all esti-
mated parameters display the expected sign - to save space, the corresponding tables are not
reported. When the sample is ordered by using dividends and cash and leverage levels, the
monotonicity condition is still empirically violated, and the inverse “U-shaped” relationship
between the investment-cash ßow sensitivity and the severity of Þnancing constraints prevails.
Such violation is, however, much less evident when the sample is ordered by size; in this case,
the investment-cash ßow sensitivity tends to increase with size - even if for class VII the null
hypothesis is only marginally not rejected.
A second concern arises from the fact that our classes are obtained by removing groups of
Þrm-year observations. In doing so, we might loose the panel structure of some sub-samples.
In our opinion, Tables 7 actually refutes this argument: in the last column of this table
we report the number of Þrm-year observations and the number of Þrms composing each
class; such Þgures, if taken together with the evidence that the entire time span is always
present across our sub-samples, suggest that the panel structure is maintained. However, we
perform an additional robustness check by repeating our testing procedure and estimating
the investment-cash ßow sensitivities by means of a pooled OLS framework - including time
and sector dummies in each model (Figure 4). Conclusions do not qualitatively di!er from
18results obtained from the previous robustness exercise: size is the only ordering criterion for
which the investment-cash ßow sensitivity tends to increase monotonically.
)please insert Figure 4 here*
This conclusion is further conÞrmed by means of a third robustness check, which we
perform by using the Fama and French (2002) approach (Figure 5). More speciÞcally, analyze
the behavior of cash ßow sensitivities across classes in each year separately - for this exercise,
we use the OLS estimator and include sector dummies in all models. Then, we calculate the
mean over years of the estimated investment-cash ßow sensitivity for each class.
)please insert Figure 5 here*
4.4 Implications for Previous Studies
Although KZ97 claim that the violation of the non-monotonicity they Þnd is pervasive and
a!ects many of the results in this literature, what their results actually document is the
presence of an inverse monotonic relationship between the investment-cash ßow sensitivity
and the degree of Þnancing constraints. In this perspective our results document, instead,
the existence of a non-monotonic investment cash-ßow sensitivity in the degree of Þnancing
constraints. Our evidence goes to add to the results by Cleary, Povel and Raith (2005)
who, using a di!erent empirical framework and a sample of U.S. observations, suggests the
existence of a non-linearity between investment and cash ßow - they show that the squared
value of the cash ßow is robustly correlated to investment.
In our case, if a standard model of investment is used, the violation of the monotonicity
condition prevails regardless of the criterion used to proxy for Þnancing constraints; if models
are augmented, or more robust estimation frameworks are used, such non-monotonic behavior
holds for classiÞcation schemes based on dividends or leverage and cash stocks, while, the
parameter of interest seems to monotonically increase with size only. However, in contrast
with the main bulk of the relevant literature, Þnancial indicator suggests that larger Þrms
may hardly be considered the relatively constrained ones - at least in the sample we are using.
Our conclusions may be then summarized as follows: either 1+ the criteria used to classify
Þrms are unrelated to Þnancing constraints, or 2+ the magnitude of the investment-cash ßow
sensitivity does not depend on the strength of Þnancing constraints only or, Þnally, 3+ both
statements are true. However, because we apply common splitting criteria, these conclusions
call into question a relevant strand of the literature about the meaning of the relationship
between sensitivity of investment to internal funds and Þnancing constraints.
19If 1+ is true and 2+ is false, the e!ort of researchers should be directed to Þnd a valid
criterion to identify the Þrms’ Þnancial status (see Angelini and Generale, 2005). However,
as we have shown, Þnancial indicators may be related to Þnancing constraints. For example,
Table 2 shows that dividend-non payer Þrms, which display a low investment-cash ßow sensi-
tivity, seem not to be Þnancially distressed. Moreover, Þnancial indicators do not exclude the
possibility of some degree of Þnancing constraints, and they show the highest market-to book
ratio, the lowest level of investment and a negative cash ßow. These characteristics might
signal the di culty of exploiting some proÞtable investment opportunities, possibly because
of the lack of internal funds or the higher cost of external Þnance. Similar argument holds
for the smallest group of Þrms - see columns B and C of Table 3.
Alternatively, if 1+ is false and 2+ is true, it is necessary to further investigate the sources
of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity. From this viewpoint, the non-monotonic behavior
we Þnd is partially consistent with theoretical models where Þnancing constraints translate
into quantitative credit constraints, rather than simply into higher costs of external Þnance
(Almeida, 2000; Almeida and Campello, 2001) and it is also consistent with theoretical models
where the relationship between the degree of Þnancial constraints and the investment-cash
ßow sensitivity depends critically on whether the measures of Þnancial constraints employed
are more correlated with Þrm internal funds or capital market imperfections - Povel and
Raith (2002) argue that this is possible because they measure di!erent dimensions of Þnancial
constraints.
To shed further light on which of the two conclusions may be holding, tables from 9 to 11
report an analysis based on tests for di!erence in means across the sub-samples we have used
in the previous analysis. This additional evidence may help in understanding whether Þnan-
cial indicators go in the same direction of that of the ordering criterion we have used to build
our sub-samples. If one of the sorting criteria is related to Þnancing constraints, we expect
that all other indicators display a monotonic behavior - always increasing or decreasing.3
)please insert Table 9 here*
)please insert Table 10 here*
)please insert Table 11 here*
Table 9 shows results from this exercise when sub-samples are ordered by dividends.
Notice that, while dividend payout ratios increase for both Þrm-year observations marked
as A and B, this is not the case for some of the remaining indicators. For example, for
3In these tables, the direction of the splitting criterion for both the observations we progressively remove
(marked as A) and the sub-samples we are progressively left (marked as B) is of course the same.
20Þrms marked as B, the level of cash holdings decreases for the classes from I to V and then
increases for the remaining classes. The contrary holds for Þrms marked as A: the statistics
increase Þrst and decrease for classes from IV to IX, and so does the strength of rejection
of the test. This suggests that dividends policy may not depend on Þnancing constraints
only, and that it may not be safe using it to classify samples of Þrms into constrained and
unconstrained sub-samples. The same holds when Þrms are ordered by the joint criterion
of cash and leverage (Table 11). For this criterion, even the size of Þrms is non-monotonic
(see Þrm-year observations marked as B). Table 10 suggests instead that, as long as Þrm size
increases, all Þnancial indicators and rejection strengths show a monotonic behavior. This
suggests that size is a safer sorting criterion, possibly because it is much less inßuenced by
Þnancial policies and managers’ decisions than variables such as dividends, cash and leverage.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper the e!ectiveness of the investment-cash ßow sensitivity criterion as a measure of
Þnancing constraints is empirically examined using a large sample of 1,195 UK non-Þnancial
Þrms over the period going from 1984 to 2002.
We study to which extent the monotonicity condition, according to which the estimated
investment-cash ßow sensitivity should always increase in the degree of Þnancing constraints,
is empirically relevant. To this aim, we order our sample of Þrms by increasing dividend
payout ratios, increasing size and classes of increasing leverage and decreasing cash holdings,
and we progressively remove the lowest classes from the sample we use to estimate empirical
models, so that Þnancing constraints should always go in the same direction - either increasing
or decreasing - without making statements on whether Þnancing constraints are decreasing or
increasing through classes. Then, we compare the investment-cash ßow sensitivities estimated
across the residual samples, and we test the null hypothesis that these parameters do not
statistically di!er from the parameter estimated for the whole sample.
Our large sample evidence shows that the monotonicity condition is consistently empiri-
cally violated when a standard model of investment is used, regardless of the variable we use
to order our sample. We Þnd traces of an inverse “U-shaped” relationship between the sen-
sitivity of investment to cash ßow and the extent of Þnancing constraints. Such results cast
additional doubts on the common practice of splitting samples of Þrms according to a priori
measures of Þnancing constraints and taking the estimated investment-cash ßow sensitivities
as a measure of Þnancing constraints faced by Þrms.
If anything, our results suggest that size seems to represent a good proxy for Þnancing
constraints. When more reÞned estimators are used, size is the only ordering criterion for
which the investment cash-ßow sensitivity displays a monotonic behavior. Moreover, all other
Þnancial indicators display a monotonic behavior with size - either always increase or decrease.
21Conversely, Þnancial variables such as dividend payout, leverage and cash stocks seem to be
poor proxies of Þnancing constraints. In our view, this happens because Þnancial ratios are
the result of a process where internal factors (Þrm characteristics, internal organization, and
managers attitudes) and external inßuences (such as cost of external Þnance and access to the
credit market) interact. It is plausible to hypothesize, for example, that managers respond
in di!erent ways to the presence of Þnancing constraints, so that Þnancial policies may or
may not entirely depend on Þnancing constraints: Þnancing constraints may represent only
some of the factors driving the investment-cash ßow sensitivity. An alternative source may
be the managers’ behavior: the sensitivity of investment to cash ßow may depend on a sort
of excessive conservatism or non-optimizing behavior of managers (Hines and Thaler, 1995;
Kaplan and Zingales, 2000). Studying the reasons behind the Þnancial conservative policies
may provide insights about the sources of such non-monotonicity, an issue that is left for
future research (Minton and Wruck, 2001; Mikkelson and Partch, 2002; Iona, Leonida and
Ozkan, 2004).
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)A B C D
Market-to-book 0.0057 0.0030 0.0062 0.0024
(8.17)*** (3.80)*** (10.2)*** (2.89)***




Cash Flow/Total Assets 0.0138 0.0021 0.0301 0.0116
(3.33)*** (0.53) (7.59)*** (2.78)***
[2.17]** [0.36] [4.58]*** [1.95]*
Cash Flow/Total Assetst-1 0.0346 0.0447
(7.81)*** (9.85)***
[5.24]*** [7.35]***
Time dummies significance 822.5*** 627.8*** 605.4*** 489.4***
Sector dummies significance 6488*** 5292***
Adjusted R
2 6.78% 7.15% 16.56% 17.55%
All variables are for the end of the fiscal year, except for cash flow and investment which
represent firm cash flow and capital expenditures during period t. Capital expenditures
divided by total assets is the dependent variable (I). Columns A and B report models
estimated by using within groups estimator with time effects. Columns C and D report
models estimated by using a pooled OLS estimator, using sector and time dummies. t
statistics are reported in brackets; heteroschedasticity consistent t-statistics are reported in
square brackets. *** (**) [*] stands for significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































%Market-to-book  I-CF Adj. R
2 # of obs. # of firms
All Firms 0.0057 (4.61)*** 0.0138 (2.17)*** 6.78% 14630 1195
Payers 0.0087 (5.76)*** 0.0250 (2.28)*** 8.22% 11734 1092
Class 1 0.0067 (5.51)*** 0.0163 (2.11)** 7.15% 13765 1165
Class 2 0.0076 (5.71)*** 0.0269 (3.49)*** 7.89% 13026 1116
Class 3 0.0084 (6.22)*** 0.0219 (3.66)*** 8.15% 12300 1107
Class 4 0.0089 (5.88)*** 0.0276 (1.75)* 8.12% 11570 1091
Class 5 0.0088 (8.74)*** 0.0222 (1.86)* 7.86% 10835 1090
Class 6 0.0083 (5.56)*** 0.0297 (1.69)* 7.54% 10103 1067
Class 7 0.0081 (5.05)*** 0.0274 (1.70)* 7.33% 9376 1047
Class 8 0.0073 (4.26)*** 0.0245 (1.88)* 6.48% 8641 998
Class 9 0.0069 (3.90)*** 0.0159 (0.95) 5.87% 7917 976
Class 10 0.0060 (3.21)*** 0.0095 (0.55) 5.47% 7160 954
Class 1 0.0074 (6.68)*** 0.0233 (3.11)*** 7.50% 13888 1161
Class 2 0.0080 (6.79)*** 0.0214 (2.50)** 7.77% 13163 1157
Class 3 0.0084 (6.79)*** 0.0234 (2.68)*** 8.39% 12423 1101
Class 4 0.0086 (6.42)*** 0.0218 (2.23)** 8.56% 11686 1068
Class 5 0.0092 (6.33)*** 0.0173 (1.79)* 8.65% 10944 1022
Class 6 0.0092 (5.76)*** 0.0128 (1.66)* 8.52% 10215 971
Class 7 0.0093 (5.59)*** 0.0073 (1.68)* 8.54% 9477 937
Class 8 0.0105 (6.03)*** 0.0113 (0.64) 9.14% 8737 860
Class 9 0.0107 (5.98)*** 0.0089 (0.59) 9.08% 8002 802
Class 10 0.0102 (5.74)*** 0.0054 (0.34) 8.98% 7273 723
Class 1 0.0075 (6.45)*** 0.0151 (2.29)** 7.29% 14237 1191
Class 2 0.0078 (6.61)*** 0.0154 (2.32)** 7.54% 14270 1188
Class 3 0.0082 (6.42)*** 0.0171 (2.44)** 7.68% 13921 1181
Class 4 0.0091 (7.01)*** 0.0230 (3.28)*** 7.94% 13379 1162
Class 5 0.0099 (6.80)*** 0.0276 (3.56)*** 8.07% 12278 1141
Class 6 0.0105 (5.79)*** 0.0341 (3.92)*** 8.51% 9409 1065
Class 7 0.0103 (3.94)*** 0.0289 (2.69)*** 8.57% 4731 713
Class 8 0.0065 (1.88)* 0.0224 (1.70)* 8.20% 3007 513
Table 7
All models are estimated using a within groups estimator. Panel A reports estimates for
all firms and the group of firms with non-negative dividends. Panel B, C and D report the
estimated coefficients for classes of dividends, size and leverage and cash holdings
respectively, as shown in Fig I. Heteroschedasticity consistent t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. *** (**) [*] stands for significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
Regression Results
Panel D: firms ordered by Leverage and Cash holdings
Panel C: firms ordered by Size
Panel B: firms ordered by Dividends
Panel A: All firms and dividends payer firmsOrdering Criteria B C D
All Firms Class 2
0.0137 0.0269
All Firms 0.0137 --------- 6.66 (0.00)***
Class 1 0.0163 0.36 (0.64) 4.29 (0.03)**
Class 2 0.0269 10.02 (0.00)*** ---------
Class 3 0.0219 3.83 (0.05)** 0.95 (0.32)
Class 4 0.0276 11.12 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.89)
Class 5 0.0222 4.12 (0.04)** 0.84 (0.35)
Class 6 0.0297 14.76 (0.00)*** 0.30 (0.58)
Class 7 0.0274 10.80 (0.00)*** 0.00 (0.92)
Class 8 0.0245 6.68 (0.00)*** 0.22 (0.63)
Class 9 0.0159 0.26 (0.61) 4.62 (0.03)**
Class 10 0.0095 1.07 (0.30) 11.57 (0.00)***
All Firms Class 1
0.0137 0.0233
All Firms 0.0137 --------- 3.45 (0.06)*
Class 1 0.0233 5.27 (0.02)** ---------
Class 2 0.0214 3.37 (0.06)* 0.14 (0.70)
Class 3 0.0234 5.38 (0.02)** 0.00 (0.99)
Class 4 0.0218 3.74 (0.05)* 0.09 (0.76)
Class 5 0.0173 0.72 (0.39)  1.36 (0.24)
Class 6 0.0128 0.06 (0.81) 4.12 (0.04)**
Class 7 0.0073 2.45 (0.12) 9.53 (0.00)***
Class 8 0.0113 0.37 (0.55) 5.38 (0.02)**
Class 9 0.0089 1.40 (0.24) 7.73 (0.00)***
Class 10 0.0054 4.11 (0.04)** 11.92 (0.00)***
All Firms Class 4
0.0137 0.0230
All Firms 0.179 0.110 0.0137 --------- 4.83 (0.02)***
Class 1 0.182 0.099 0.0151 0.10 (0.75) 3.81 (0.05)**
Class 2 0.183 0.096 0.0154 0.15 (0.69) 2.56 (0.10)*
Class 3 0.186 0.087 0.0171 0.64 (0.42) 1.55 (0.21)
Class 4 0.191 0.076 0.0230 4.94 (0.02)** ---------
Class 5 0.198 0.061 0.0276 11.12 (0.00)*** 0.92 (0.33)
Class 6 0.214 0.035 0.0341 24.05 (0.00)*** 5.39 (0.02)**
Class 7 0.239 0.011 0.0289 13.31 (0.00)*** 1.52 (0.22)
Class 8 0.247 0.006 0.0224 4.32 (0.04)** 1.87 (0.19)
Classes of  Dividends










Column A reports the levelof the criteria we use to order the sub-samples. Column B reports the
estimates of the investment-cash flow sensitivities across classes of firms ordered by alternative
criteria. Column C reports results from our testing procedure. The null hypothesis is that the
investment-cash flow sensitivity estimated for all sample equals the same parameter estimated for
each class of firms. In column D the null hypothesis is that the investment-cash flow sensitivity
estimated for the first class rejecting the null in column C equals the same parameter estimated
for each class of firms. *** (**) [*] means that the null hypothesis is rejected at 1% (5%) [10%]
significance level.
Table 8





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
A 0.108 0.113 0.132 0.140 0.127 0.119 0.114 0.110 0.107
B 0.110 0.110 0.106 0.103 0.105 0.106 0.108 0.110 0.113
t-value -0.4 0.8 7.8** 12.7** 8.1** 5.0** 2.4* 0.0 -2.7**
A 0.212 0.244 0.236 0.231 0.229 0.223 0.215 0.210 0.206
B 0.177 0.172 0.169 0.166 0.162 0.160 0.159 0.158 0.157
t-value 6.1** 17.4** 19.6** 21.3** 23.9** 23.3** 21.8** 20.8** 20.2**
A 1.415 1.636 1.822 1.832 1.802 1.777 1.765 1.743 1.727
B 1.640 1.628 1.595 1.578 1.571 1.565 1.556 1.553 1.549
t-value 5.0** 0.2 8.3** 10.4** 10.2** 9.9** 10.2** 9.5** 9.1**
A -0.040 -0.066 -0.083 -0.090 -0.051 -0.024 -0.003 0.012 0.023
B 0.074 0.084 0.095 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.107 0.107 0.106
t-value -18.1** -33.5** -49.5** -64.9** -54.7** -46.8** -39.9** -34.9** -30.5**
A 9.699 9.581 9.537 9.624 9.834 10.003 10.136 10.225 10.321
B 10.879 10.957 11.046 11.118 11.148 11.169 11.187 11.215 11.227
t-value -16.1** -26.3** -34.9** -39.1** -37.0** -34.6** -32.3** -31.2** -28.9**
A -1.775 -0.888 -0.592 -0.444 -0.343 -0.270 -0.215 -0.171 -0.137
B 0.188 0.198 0.210 0.223 0.234 0.244 0.253 0.264 0.275
t-value -14.8** -11.2** -9.8** -9.2** -8.6** -8.1** -7.7** -7.3** -7.0**
A 0.081 0.078 0.077 0.072 0.076 0.079 0.081 0.083 0.085
B 0.082 0.083 0.083 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.080
t-value -0.3 -2.2* -3.2** -7.0** -4.7** -2.7** -1.0 0.9 3.2**
Removed A 731 1462 2193 2924 3655 4386 5117 5848 6579
Others B 13907 13176 12445 11714 10983 10252 9521 8790 8059









Financial indicators relating to the sub-samples of firms which are progressively removed are
marked as A; financial variables relating to the sub-samples we are progressively left are marked





















VariablesI II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
A 0.345 0.313 0.299 0.282 0.266 0.253 0.240 0.232 0.223
B 0.171 0.165 0.158 0.154 0.150 0.148 0.147 0.144 0.143
t-value 12.0** 14.1** 15.9** 16.3** 15.9** 15.2** 14.0** 13.7** 12.6**
A 0.410 0.399 0.385 0.367 0.349 0.334 0.322 0.310 0.304
B 0.196 0.185 0.175 0.167 0.160 0.153 0.145 0.138 0.128
t-value 14.0** 19.4** 22.7** 24.4** 24.9** 25.3** 25.7** 25.9** 26.8**
A 2.602 2.229 2.052 1.961 1.888 1.827 1.780 1.755 1.728
B 1.578 1.562 1.554 1.546 1.543 1.544 1.547 1.545 1.547
t-value 23.1** 20.7** 18.3** 17.1** 15.3** 13.3** 11.3** 10.5** 9.2**
A -0.079 -0.030 -0.004 0.007 0.020 0.030 0.036 0.042 0.046
B 0.076 0.080 0.081 0.084 0.085 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.087
t-value -24.8** -24.2** -22.4** -22.6** -20.6** -18.6** -17.2** -15.6** -14.6**
A 7.332 7.822 8.132 8.374 8.574 8.744 8.898 9.040 9.172
B 11.004 11.153 11.294 11.431 11.568 11.708 11.853 12.005 12.165
t-value 54.7** 72.6** 86.5** 98.1** 108.5** 118.5** 127.8** 136.5** 144.7**
A -0.029 0.023 0.052 0.068 0.078 0.089 0.092 0.096 0.101
B 0.096 0.097 0.097 0.096 0.094 0.091 0.089 0.086 0.081
t-value -0.9 -0.8 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4
A 0.064 0.069 0.071 0.072 0.073 0.076 0.076 0.077 0.077
B 0.086 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.086 0.086
t-value -5.8** -6.4** -6.7** -7.5** -7.3** -6.0** -6.1** -6.4** -6.3**
removed A 731 1462 2193 2924 3655 4386 5117 5848 6579

















Test for Difference in Means for Samples Ordered by Size
Financial indicators relating to the sub-samples of firms which are progressively removed are
marked as A; financial variables relating to the sub-samples we are progressively left are marked












DividendsI II III IV V VI VII VIII
A 0.703 0.665 0.565 0.470 0.366 0.246 0.158 0.139
B 0.099 0.096 0.087 0.077 0.061 0.035 0.011 0.007
t-value 83.6** 96.1** 127.1** 150.6** 157.7** 123.8** 67.5** 50.4**
A 0.006 0.012 0.032 0.046 0.076 0.114 0.150 0.159
B 0.182 0.183 0.186 0.191 0.199 0.215 0.239 0.250
t-value -19.06** -21.5** -27.2** -33.8** -37.9** -40.8** -34.8** -30.8**
A 3.203 3.092 2.814 2.559 2.306 1.978 1.751 1.701
B 1.600 1.592 1.569 1.542 1.499 1.435 1.373 1.368
t-value 22.1** 24.1** 27.9** 29.9** 31.3** 27.2** 18.3** 14.1**
A -0.061 -0.047 0.006 0.043 0.065 0.078 0.079 0.077
B 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.071 0.069 0.063 0.048 0.039
t-value -12.7** -13.2** -10.2** -5.7** -1.0 5.3** 10.5** 11.1**
A 9.055 9.164 9.480 9.745 10.190 10.715 11.031 11.020
B 10.852 10.862 10.888 10.921 10.941 10.879 10.379 10.096
t-value -15.0** -16.5** -18.9** -20.8** -17.4** -4.9** 19.3** 24.2**
A -0.261 -0.159 -0.002 0.070 0.103 0.130 0.131 0.098
B 0.096 0.096 0.095 0.092 0.088 0.068 0.005 0.062
t-value -1.86* -1.3 -0.7 -0.2 0.2 1.0 2.0* 0.5
A 0.038 0.043 0.051 0.061 0.067 0.073 0.081 0.082
B 0.083 0.083 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.087 0.085 0.083
t-value -8.7** -9.0** -10.0** -9.5** -9.6** -9.5** -2.8** -0.3
removed A 263 357 703 1251 2354 5224 9903 11475



























Test for Difference in Means for Samples Ordered by Leverage and Cash Holdings
Dividends
Variables
Financial indicators relating to the sub-samples of firms which are progressively removed are
marked as A; financial variables relating to the sub-samples we are progressively left are marked
ad B. ** (*) stand for rejection of the null hypothesis of equality of means at the 1% (5%) level.
Sub-samples